Abstract-We introduce the area of remote physical device fingerprinting, or fingerprinting a physical device, as opposed to an operating system or class of devices, remotely, and without the fingerprinted device's known cooperation. We accomplish this goal by exploiting small, microscopic deviations in device hardware: clock skews. Our techniques do not require any modification to the fingerprinted devices. Our techniques report consistent measurements when the measurer is thousands of miles, multiple hops, and tens of milliseconds away from the fingerprinted device and when the fingerprinted device is connected to the Internet from different locations and via different access technologies. Further, one can apply our passive and semipassive techniques when the fingerprinted device is behind a NAT or firewall, and also when the device's system time is maintained via NTP or SNTP. One can use our techniques to obtain information about whether two devices on the Internet, possibly shifted in time or IP addresses, are actually the same physical device. Example applications include: computer forensics; tracking, with some probability, a physical device as it connects to the Internet from different public access points; counting the number of devices behind a NAT even when the devices use constant or random IP IDs; remotely probing a block of addresses to determine if the addresses correspond to virtual hosts, e.g., as part of a virtual honeynet; and unanonymizing anonymized network traces.
INTRODUCTION
T HERE are now a number of powerful techniques for remote operating system fingerprinting, i.e., techniques for remotely determining the operating systems of devices on the Internet [2], [3] , [5] , [35] . We push this idea further and introduce the notion of remote physical device fingerprinting, or remotely fingerprinting a physical device, as opposed to an operating system or class of devices, without the fingerprinted device's known cooperation. We accomplish this goal to varying degrees of precision by exploiting microscopic deviations in device hardware: clock skews.
Classes of Fingerprinting Techniques
We consider three main classes of remote physical device fingerprinting techniques: passive, active, and semipassive. The first two have standard definitions-to apply a passive fingerprinting technique, the fingerprinter (measurer, attacker, adversary) must be able to observe traffic from the device (the fingerprintee) that the attacker wishes to fingerprint, whereas to apply an active fingerprinting technique, the fingerprinter must have the ability to initiate connections to the fingerprintee. Our third class of techniques, which we refer to as semipassive fingerprinting techniques, assumes that after the fingerprintee initiates a connection, the fingerprinter has the ability to interact with the fingerprintee over that connection; e.g., the fingerprinter is a Web site with which the device is communicating, or is an ISP in the middle capable of modifying packets en route.
Each class of techniques has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, passive techniques are completely undetectable to the fingerprinted device, passive and semipassive techniques can be applied even if the fingerprinted device is behind a NAT or firewall, and semipassive and active techniques can potentially be applied over longer periods of time, e.g., after a laptop connects to a Web site and the connection terminates, the Web site can still continue to run active measurements.
Methodology
For all our methods, we stress that the fingerprinter does not require any modification to or cooperation from the fingerprintee, e.g., we tested our techniques with default Red Hat 9.0, Debian 3.0, FreeBSD 5.2.1, OpenBSD 3.5, OS X 10.3.5, Windows XP SP2, and Windows for Pocket PC 2002 installations. 1 In Table 1 , we summarize our preferred methods for fingerprinting the most popular operating systems.
Our preferred passive and semipassive techniques exploit the fact that most modern TCP stacks implement the TCP timestamps option from RFC 1323 [18] whereby, for performance purposes, each party in a TCP flow includes information about its perception of time in each outgoing packet. A fingerprinter can use the information contained within the TCP headers to estimate a device's clock skew and, thereby, fingerprint a physical device. We stress that one can use our TCP timestamps-based method even when the fingerprintee's system time is maintained via NTP [25] . While most modern operating systems enable the TCP 1 . One can apply our techniques to the default installs of other versions of these operating systems; here, we just mention the most recent stable versions of the operating systems that we analyzed.
timestamps option by default, Windows 2000 and XP machines do not. Therefore, we developed a trick to convince Microsoft Windows 2000 and XP machines to use the TCP timestamps option in Windows-initiated flows; the trick involves an intentional violation of RFC 1323 on the part of a semipassive or active adversary. In addition to our TCP timestamps-based approach, we consider passive fingerprinting techniques that exploit the difference in time between how often other periodic activities are supposed to occur and how often they actually occur, and we show how one might use a Fourier transform on packet arrival times to infer a device's clock skew. Since we believe that our TCP timestamps-based approach is currently our most general passive technique, we focus on the TCP timestamps approach in this paper.
An active adversary could also exploit the ICMP protocol to fingerprint a physical device. Namely, an active adversary could issue ICMP Timestamp Request messages to the fingerprintee and record a trace of the resulting ICMP Timestamp Reply messages. If the fingerprintee does not maintain its system time via NTP or does so only infrequently and if the fingerprintee replies to ICMP Timestamp Requests, then an adversary analyzing the resulting ICMP Timestamp Reply messages will be able to estimate the fingerprintee's system time clock skew. Default Red Hat 9.0, Debian 3.0, FreeBSD 5.2.1, OpenBSD 3.5, and Windows 2000 and XP and Pocket PC 2002 installations all satisfy the above preconditions.
Parameters of Investigation
Toward developing the area of remote physical device fingerprinting via remote clock skew estimation, we must address the following set of interrelated questions:
1. For what operating systems are our remote clock skew estimation techniques applicable? 2. Can one expect two machines to have measurably different clock skews? Specifically, what is the distribution of clock skews across multiple fingerprintees and what is the resolution of our clock skew estimation techniques? 3. For a single fingerprintee, can one expect the clock skew estimate of that fingerprintee to be relatively constant over long periods of time, and through reboots, power cycles, and periods of down time? 4. What are the effects of a fingerprintee's access technology (e.g., wireless, wired, dialup, cable modem) on the clock skew estimates for the device?
5. How are the clock skew estimates affected by the distance between the fingerprinter and the fingerprintee? 6. Are the clock skew estimates independent of the fingerprinter? When multiple fingerprinters are measuring a single fingerprintee at the same time, will they all output (approximately) the same skew estimates? 7. How much data do we need to be able to remotely make accurate clock skew estimates? Question 6 is pertinent because common fingerprinters will probably use NTP-based time synchronization when capturing packets, as opposed to more precise CDMA or GPS-synchronized timestamps. Answers to the above questions will help determine the efficacy of our physical device fingerprinting techniques.
Experiments and High-Level Results
To understand and refine our techniques, we conducted experiments with machines that we controlled and that ran a variety of operating systems, including popular Linux, BSD, and Microsoft distributions. In all cases, we found that we could use at least one of our techniques to estimate clock skews of the machines, and that we required only a small amount of data, though the exact data requirements depended on the operating system in question. For the most popular operating systems, we observed that when the system did not use NTP or SNTP-based time synchronization, then the TCP timestamps-based and the ICMPbased techniques yielded approximately the same skew estimates. Furthermore, for the most popular operating systems we observed that our TCP timestamps-based skew estimates were approximately the same regardless of whether or not a host used NTP-based time synchronization. These results, coupled with details that we describe in the body, motivated us to use the TCP timestamps-based method in most of our experiments. We survey some of our experiments here.
To understand the effects of topology and access technology on our skew estimates, we fixed the location of the fingerprinter and applied our TCP timestamps-based technique to a single laptop in multiple locations, on both North American coasts, from wired, wireless, and dialup locations, and from home, business, and campus environments (Table 5 ). All clock skew estimates for the laptop were close-the difference between the maximum and the minimum skew estimate was only 0.67 ppm, or 0.67 microseconds per second. We also simultaneously measured the clock skew of the laptop and another machine from multiple PlanetLab nodes throughout the world, as well as from a machine of our own with a CDMA-synchronized Dag card [1] , [12] , [15] , [23] for taking network traces with precise timestamps (Table 6 ). With the exception of the measurements taken by a PlanetLab machine in India (over 300 ms round trip time away), for each experiment, all the fingerprinters (in North America, Europe, and Asia) reported skew estimates within only 0.56 ppm of each other. These experiments suggest that, except for extreme cases, the results of our clock skew estimation techniques are independent of access technology and topology.
Toward understanding the distribution of clock skews across machines, we applied the TCP timestamps technique to the devices in a trace collected on one of the US's Tier 1 OC-48 links (Fig. 2) . We also measured the clock skews of 69 (seemingly) identical Windows XP SP1 machines in one of our institution's undergraduate computing facilities (Fig. 3) . The latter experiment, which ran for 38 days, as well as other experiments, show that the clock skew estimates for any given machine are approximately constant over time, but that different machines can have detectably different clock skews. Last, we use the results of these and other experiments to argue that the amount of data (packets and duration of data) necessary to perform our skew estimation techniques is low, e.g., see Tables 3 and 5 .
Applications and Additional Experiments
To test the applicability of our techniques, we applied our techniques to a honeyd [31] virtual honeynet consisting of 100 virtual Linux 2.4.18 hosts and 100 virtual Windows XP SP1 hosts. Our experiments showed with overwhelming probability that the TCP flows and ICMP timestamp responses were all handled by a single machine as opposed to 200 different machines. We also applied our techniques to a network of five virtual machines running under VMware Workstation [4] on a single machine. In this case, the clock skew estimates of the virtual machines are significantly different from what one would expect from real machines (the skews were large and not constant over time; Fig. 5 ). An application of our techniques, or natural extensions, might therefore be to remotely detect virtual honeynets.
Another application of our techniques is to count the number of hosts behind a NAT, even if those hosts use random or constant IP IDs to counter Bellovin's attack [7] , even if all the hosts run the same operating system, and even if not all of the hosts are up at the same time. Furthermore, when both our techniques and Bellovin's techniques are applicable, we expect our approach to provide a much higher degree of resolution. One could also use our techniques for forensics purposes, e.g., to argue whether or not a given laptop was connected to the Internet from a given access location. One could also use our techniques to help track laptops as they move, perhaps as part of a Carnivore-like project (here, we envision our skew estimates as one important component of the tracking; other components could be information gleaned from existing operating system fingerprinting techniques, usage characteristics, and other heuristics). One can also use our techniques to catalyze the unanonymization of prefixpreserving anonymized network traces [36] , [37] .
Protecting against Our Current Attacks and Future Directions
Although the physical device fingerprinting techniques that we introduce in this paper will likely remain applicable to current generation systems, we suspect that future generation security systems might try to resist some of our fingerprinting techniques. To aid the developers of future systems, we explore some possible mechanisms for protecting against our current fingerprinting techniques. As a simple solution, a device might simply ignore ICMP Timestamp Requests and not enable the TCP timestamps option in outgoing TCP packets. A device might also choose to maintain its system time via NTP and somehow reduce the skew in its TCP timestamps clock. A device might also randomize or mask the TCP timestamps that it includes in each outgoing TCP packet. We then propose several possible research directions for fingerprinting physical devices that implement some of our protection mechanisms.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
It has long been known that seemingly identical computers can have disparate clock skews. The NTP [25] specification describes a method for reducing the clock skews of devices' system clocks, though over short periods of time an NTP-synchronized machine may still have slight clock skew. In 1998, Paxson [29] initiated a line of research geared toward eliminating clock skew from network measurements, and one of the algorithms we use is based on a descendent of the Paxson paper by Moon et al. [26] . Further afield, though still related to clock skews, Pásztor and Veitch [28] have created a software clock on a commodity PC with high accuracy and small clock skew. One fundamental difference between our work and previous work is our goal: Whereas all previous works focus on creating methods for eliminating the effects of clock skews, our work exploits and capitalizes on the effects of clock skews. Well-known operating system fingerprinting tools include nmap [2], xprobe2 [5], p0f [3] , and RING [35] . The nmap and p0f tools use TCP timestamps to remotely obtain the uptimes of some systems, per [21] . Anagnostakis et al. [6] use ICMP Timestamp Requests to study router queuing delays. With respect to tracking physical devices, it is well known that a network card's MAC address is supposed to be unique and, therefore, could serve as a fingerprint of a device assuming that the adversary can observe the device's MAC address and that the owner of the card has not changed the MAC address. The main advantage of our techniques over a MAC address-based approach is that our techniques are mountable by adversaries thousands of miles and multiple hops away. One could also use cookies or any other persistent data to track a physical device, but such persistent data may not always be available to an adversary, perhaps because the user is privacy-conscious and tries to minimize storage and transmission of such data, or because the user never communicates that data unencrypted. The amateur radio community has independently developed a tool for fingerprinting radios that exploits a radio's frequency characteristics [32] .
Our work in Section 11 builds on previous network spectroscopy research in detecting link-layer technologies (ATM, DSL, cable modems) by delay quantization of IP packet traffic [10] and on operating system fingerprinting by DNS update traffic [11] . In [9] , we use traceroute delays to fingerprint routers. Partridge et al. [27] use Lomb periodograms to detect the presence of traffic that is otherwise not observed on a network via the spikes in the spectral density that correspond to intervals occupied by missing packets. Hussain et al. [17] use the power distribution in the Fourier spectrum of autocorrelation functions of binned packet traffic to distinguish between multiple-source and single-source denial-of-service attacks. In Section 11, we propose using a full precision (without binning) Fourier transform of packet arrival times to extract clock skews from periodic processes.
An extended abstract of this paper appears at the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [20] .
CLOCKS AND CLOCK SKEWS
When discussing clocks and clock skews, we build on the nomenclature from the NTP specification [25] and from Paxson [29] . A clock C is designed to represent the amount of time that has passed since some initial time i½C. Clock C's resolution, r½C, is the smallest unit by which the clock can be incremented, and we refer to each such increment as a tick. A resolution of 10 ms means that the clock is designed to have 10 ms granularity, not that the clock is always incremented exactly every 10 ms. Clock C's intended frequency, Hz½C, is the inverse of its resolution; e.g., a clock with 10 ms granularity is designed to run at 100 Hz. For all t ! i½C, let R½CðtÞ denote the time reported by clock C at time t, where t denotes the true time as defined by national standards. The offset of clock C, off½C, is the difference between the time reported by C and the true time, i.e., off½CðtÞ ¼ R½CðtÞ À t for all t ! i½C. A clock's skew, s½C, is the first derivative of its offset with respect to time, where we assume for simplicity that R½C is a differentiable function in t. We report skew estimates in microseconds per second (s=s) or, equivalently, parts per million (ppm). As we shall show, and as others have also concluded [29] , [26] , [34] , it is often reasonable to assume that a clock's skew is constant. When the clock in question is clear from context, we shall remove the parameter C from our notation, e.g., s½C becomes s.
A given device can have multiple, possibly independent, clocks. For remote physical device fingerprinting, we exploit two different clocks: the clock corresponding to a device's system time, and a clock internal to a device's TCP network stack, which we call the device's TCP timestamps option clock or TSopt clock. We do not consider the hardware bases for these clocks here since our focus is not on understanding why these clocks have skews, but on exploiting the fact these clocks can have measurable skews on popular current generation systems.
The System Clock
To most users of a computer system, the most visible clock is the device's system clock, C sys , which is designed to represent the real time as defined by national standards. Although the system clocks on professionally administered machines are often approximately synchronized with true time via NTP [25] or, less accurately, via SNTP [24] , we stress that it is much less likely for the system clocks on nonprofessionally managed machines to be externally synchronized. This lack of synchronization is because the default installations of most of the popular operating systems that we tested do not synchronize the hosts' system clocks with true time or, if they do, they do so only infrequently. For example, default Windows XP Professional installations only synchronize their system times with Microsoft's NTP server when they boot and once a week thereafter. Default Red Hat 9.0 Linux installations do not use NTP by default, though they do present the user with the option of entering an NTP server. Default Debian 3.0, FreeBSD 5.2.1, and OpenBSD 3.5 systems, under the configurations that we selected (e.g., "typical user"), do not even present the user with the option of enabling ntpd. For such a nonprofessionally administered machine, if an adversary can learn the values of the machine's system clock at multiple points in time, the adversary will be able to infer information about the device's system clock skew, s½C sys . For physical device fingerprinting, the most important property of the TCP timestamps option is that if a flow uses the option, then a portion of the header of each TCP packet in that flow will contain a 32-bit timestamp generated by the creator of that packet. The RFC does not dictate what values the timestamps should take, but does say that the timestamps should be taken from a "virtual clock" that is "at least approximately proportional to real time [18] ;" the RFC 1323 PAWS algorithm does stipulate (Section 4.2.2) that the resolution of this virtual clock be between 1 ms and 1 second. We refer to this "virtual clock" as the device's TCP timestamps option clock, or its TSopt clock C tcp . There is no requirement that a device's TSopt clock and its system clock be correlated. Moreover, for popular operating systems like Windows XP, Linux, and FreeBSD, a device's TSopt clock may be unaffected by adjustments to the device's system clock via NTP. Table 2 lists the intended frequencies, Hz½C tcp , for several popular operating systems.
2 Most systems reset their TSopt clock to zero upon reboot; on these systems i½C tcp is the time at which the system booted. If an adversary can learn the values of a device's TSopt clock at multiple points in time, then the adversary may be able to infer information about the device's TSopt clock skew, s½C tcp .
EXPLOITING THE TCP TIMESTAMPS OPTION
In this section, we consider 1) how an adversary might obtain samples of a device's TSopt clock at multiple points in time and 2) how an adversary could use those samples to fingerprint a physical device. We consider the efficacy of and the data requirements for our approach in later sections. We assume for now that there is a one-to-one correspondence between physical devices and IP addresses, and defer to Section 9 a discussion of how to deal with multiple active hosts behind a NAT; in this section, we do consider NATs with a single active device behind them.
The Measurer
The measurer can be any entity capable of observing TCP packets from the fingerprintee, assuming that those packets have the TCP timestamps option enabled. The measurer could therefore be the fingerprintee's ISP, or any tap in the middle of the network over which packets from the device travel, e.g., we apply our techniques to a trace taken on a major Tier 1 ISP's backbone OC-48 links. The measurer could also be any system with which the fingerprintee frequently communicates; prime examples of such systems include a search engine like Google, a news Web site, and a click-through ads service that displays content on a large number of Web sites. If the measurer is active, then the measurer could also be the one to initiate a TCP flow with the fingerprintee, assuming that the device is reachable and has an open port. If the measurer is semipassive or active, then it could make the flows that it observes last abnormally long, thereby giving the measurer samples of the fingerprintee's clock over extended periods of time.
A Trick for Measuring Windows 2000 and XP Machines
We seek the ability to measure TSopt clock skews of Windows 2000 and XP machines even if those machines are behind NATs and firewalls. More generally, we are interested in measuring the TSopt clock skews of Windows machines when we are limited to analyzing flows initiated by the Windows machines. Unfortunately, because Windows 2000 and XP machines do not include the TCP timestamps option in their initial SYN packets, the TCP timestamps RFC [18] mandates that none of the subsequent packets in Windows-initiated flows can include the TCP timestamps option. Thus, assuming that all parties correctly implement the TCP RFCs, a passive adversary will not be able to exploit the TCP timestamps option with Windows 2000/XP-initiated flows.
If the adversary is semipassive, we observe the following trick. Assume for simplicity that the adversary is the device to whom the Windows machine is connecting. After receiving the initial SYN packet from the Windows machine, the adversary will reply with a SYN/ACK, but the adversary will break the RFC 1323 specification and include the TCP timestamps option in its reply. After receiving such a reply, our Windows 2000 and XP machines ignored the fact that they did not include the TCP timestamps option in their initial SYN packets, and included the TCP timestamps option in all of their subsequent packets. An adversary can therefore apply our techniques to estimate the TSopt clock skews of Windows machines even if they are behind NATs or firewalls.
As an extension, we note that the adversary does not have to be the device to whom the Windows machine is connecting. Rather, the adversary simply needs to be able to mount a "device-in-the-middle" attack and modify packets such that the Windows machine receives one with the TCP timestamps option turned on. If the adversary is the device's ISP, then the adversary could rewrite the Windows machine's initial SYN packets so that they include the TCP timestamps option. The SYN/ACKs from the legitimate recipients will therefore have the TCP timestamps option enabled and from that point forward the Windows machine will include the TCP timestamps option in all subsequent packets in the flows.
We applied this technique to Windows XP machines on a residential cable system with a LinkSys Wireless Access Point and a NAT, as well as to Windows XP SP2 machines using the default XP SP2 firewall, and to Windows XP SP1 machines with the Windows ZoneAlarm firewall. While current firewalls do not detect this trick, future firewalls might.
Estimating the TSopt Clock Skew
Let us now assume that an adversary has obtained a trace T of TCP packets from the fingerprintee, and let us assume for simplicity that all jT j packets in the trace have the TCP 2. We do not generalize the Debian and Red Hat columns to all Linux distributions since Knoppix 3.6 with the 2.6.7 experimental kernel has 1 ms resolution. It is worth elaborating on our claim that Pocket PC 2002 systems have TSopt clocks with 100 ms resolution, or intended frequencies of 10 Hz. In experiments with five HP iPAQ h5450 PDAs running Windows Pocket PC 2002, using our techniques from Section 4, we measured TSopt clock frequencies between 8.4 and 9.6 Hz. Despite these measurements, we believe that the intended frequency for Pocket PC 2002 devices is 10 Hz since 1) the intended frequency for Windows 2000 and XP machines is 10 Hz and 2) we assume that the large difference between 10 Hz and the frequencies that we measured is due to the fact that the PDAs likely have cheaper clocks than our laptop and desktop systems. timestamps option enabled. Toward estimating a device's TSopt clock skew s½C tcp , we adopt the following additional notation. Let t i be the time in seconds at which the measurer observed the ith packet in T and let T i be the C tcp timestamp contained within the ith packet. Define
The unit for w i is seconds, y i is the observed offset of the ith packet, O T is the offset-set corresponding to the trace T . We discuss below how to compute Hz if it is not known to the measurer in advance. As an example, Fig. 1 shows the offset-sets for two devices in a two-hour trace of traffic from an Internet backbone OC-48 link on 2004-04-28 (we omit IP addresses for privacy reasons). Respectively, shifting the clocks by t 1 and T 1 for x i and v i is not necessary for our analysis, but makes plots like in Fig. 1 easier to read.
If we could assume that the measurer's clock is accurate and that the t values represent true time, and if we could assume that there is no delay between when the fingerprintee generates the ith packet and when the measurer records the ith packet, then y i ¼ offðx i þ t 1 Þ. Under these assumptions, and if we make the additional assumption that R is differentiable, then the first derivative of y, which is the slope of the points in O T , is the skew s of C tcp . Since we cannot generally make these assumptions, we are left to approximate s from the data.
Let us consider plots like those in Fig. 1 more closely. We first observe that the large band corresponds to a device where the TSopt clock has low resolution (r ¼ 100ms) and that the narrow band corresponds to a device with a higher resolution (r ¼ 10ms). The width of these bands and, in particular the wide band, means that if the duration of our trace is short, we cannot always approximate the slope of the points in O T by computing the slope between any two points in the set. Moreover, as Paxson and others have noted in similar contexts [29] , [26] , variable network delay renders simple least-squares linear regression insufficient.
Consequently, to approximate the skew s from O T , we borrow a linear programming solution from Moon et al. [26] , which has as its core Graham's convex hull algorithm on sorted data [16] ; see also [13] , [22] .
The linear programming solution outputs the equation of a line x þ that upper-bounds the set of points O T . We use an upper bound because network and host delays are all positive. The slope of the line, , is our estimate of the clock skew of C tcp . In detail, the linear programming constraints for this line are that, for all i 2 f1; . . . ; jT jg,
which means that the solution must upper-bound all the points in O T . The linear programming solution then minimizes the average vertical distance of all the points in O T from the line; i.e., the linear programming solution is one that minimizes the objective function
Although one can solve the above using standard linear programming techniques, as Moon et al. [26] note, there exist techniques to solve linear programming problems in two variables in linear time [13] , [22] . We use a linear time algorithm in all our computations.
It remains to discuss how to infer Hz if the measurer does not know it in advance. One solution involves computing the slope of the points I ¼ fðx i ; v i Þ : i 2 f1; . . . ; jT jg and rounding to the nearest integer. One can compute the slope of this set by adapting the above linear programming problem to this set.
An Equivalent View
If A is the slope of the points in the above set I, derived using the linear programming algorithm, then one could also approximate the skew of C tcp as A=Hz À 1. We can prove that, when using the linear programming method for slope estimation, both approaches produce the same skew estimate. We use the offset-set approach since these sets naturally yield figures where the skews are clearly visible, e.g., Fig. 1 .
EXPLOITING ICMP TIMESTAMP REQUESTS
We now consider how an adversary might obtain samples of a device's system clock and how an adversary could use those samples to fingerprint a physical device.
The Measurer
To exploit a device's system time clock skew, the measurer could be any Web site with which the fingerprintee communicates, or any other device on the Internet provided that the measurer is capable of issuing ICMP Timestamp Requests (ICMP message type 13) to the fingerprintee. The measurer must also be capable of recording the fingerprintee's subsequent ICMP Timestamp Reply messages (ICMP message type 14). The primary limitation is that the device must not be behind a NAT or firewall that filters ICMP. 
Estimating the System Clock Skew
Let us now assume that an adversary has obtained a trace T of ICMP Timestamp Reply messages from the fingerprintee. The ICMP Timestamp Reply messages will contain two 32-bit values generated by the fingerprintee. The first value is the time at which the corresponding ICMP Timestamp Request packet was received, and the second value is the time at which the ICMP Timestamp Reply was generated; here time is according to the fingerprintee's system clock, C sys , and is reported in milliseconds since midnight UTC. Windows machines report the timestamp in little endian format, whereas all the other machines that we tested report the timestamp in big endian notation. The remaining notation and the method for skew estimation is now identical to what we presented in Section 4, with two minor exceptions. First, the adversary does not have to compute Hz since RFC 792 [30] requires that Hz be 1,000 (or, if not, that a special bit be set to indicate noncompliance). Second, since the time reported in the ICMP Timestamp Reply is in milliseconds since midnight UTC, we expect the timestamps reported in the ICMP Timestamp Reply messages to reset approximately once a day; we adjust the v values accordingly. The only thing special that our attack exploits about ICMP is the fact that ICMP has a message type that will reveal a device's system time; our techniques would work equally well with any other protocol that leaks information about a device's system or other clock.
Brief Comparison with TCP Timestamps
For much of the rest of this paper, we focus on our TCP timestamps-based approach for physical device fingerprinting rather than our ICMP-based approach. We do so not because we consider the ICMP-based approach to be inferior. Rather, we focus on the TCP timestamps-based approach because most systems have TSopt clocks that operate at lower frequencies than the 1,000 Hz clocks included in the ICMP timestamp reply messages, which means that it should require less data for an active adversary to mount our ICMP fingerprinting technique than to mount our TCP timestamps technique. Focusing on our TCP timestamps-based approach also allows us to experiment with machines behind NATs and firewalls. Lastly, for popular operating systems, if a system does not externally synchronize its system time, then the system's TSopt and system clocks will be highly correlated (Section 8), which means that the distribution of system clock skews for machines not using NTP will be similar to the distribution of TSopt clocks skews.
DISTRIBUTION AND STABILITY OF TSOPT CLOCK SKEW MEASUREMENTS
We now address two fundamental properties that must hold in order for remote clock skew estimation to be an effective physical device fingerprinting technique. First, we show that there is variability in different devices' clock skews, meaning that it is reasonable to expect different devices on the Internet to have measurably different clock skews. Second, we give evidence to suggest that clock skews, as measured by our techniques, are relatively constant over time. These two facts provide the basis for our use of remote clock skew estimation as a physical device fingerprinting technique since they imply that an adversary can gain (sometimes significant) information by applying our techniques to measure a device's or set of devices' clock skews. The novelty here is not in claiming that these properties are true. Indeed, it is well known that different computer systems can have different clock skews, and others [29] , [26] , [28] , [34] have argued that a given device generally has a constant clock skew. Rather, the contribution here is showing that these properties survive our remote clock skew estimation techniques and, in the case of our analyses of the distribution of clock skews, measuring the bits of information (entropy) a passive adversary might learn by passively measuring the TSopt clock skews of fingerprintees.
Distribution of Clock Skews:
Analysis of Passive Traces [15] cards in each direction; these cards' clocks were synchronized with each other, but not with true time. This latter property does not affect the following discussion because 1) the clock skews of the Dag cards appear to be constant and, therefore, only shift our skew estimates by a constant amount and 2) here, we are only interested in the general distribution of the clock skews of the sources in the traces. Let mp and md be positive integers. For simplicity, fix BB ¼ BB N or BB S . Also assume for simplicity that BB only contains TCP packets with the TCP timestamps option turned on. Recall that the trace BB lasts for two hours. At a high-level, our analysis considers the set S of sources in BB that have ! mp packets in both the first and the second hours, and where the differences in time between the source's first and last packets in each hour are ! md minutes.
For each source in S, we apply our clock skew estimation technique from Section 4 to the full trace, the first hour only, and the second hour only. Let pv be a positive number, and let S 0 be the subset of S corresponding to the sources whose skew estimates for the full trace, the first hour, and the second hour are all within pv ppm of each other, and whose intended frequency Hz is one of the standard values (1, 2, 10, 100, 512, 1,000). If pv is small, then we are inclined to believe that the skew estimates for the sources in S 0 closely approximate the true skews of the respective sources. Table 3 shows values of jSj and jS 0 j for different values of mp and md and BB ¼ BB N and when we arbitrarily choose pv ¼ 1 ppm. The value jS 0 j=jSj gives an indication of the ratio of sources for which we can accurately (within pv ppm) measure the clock skew. For example, more than 50 percent of the sources in S are also in S 0 when we consider sources that are active for at least 30 minutes in each hour (md ¼ 30). When we add the constraint that each source in S send at least 500 packets per hour, the percentage of sources in S 0 increases to 60 percent. While useful, this ratio provides little information about the actual distribution of the clock skew estimates. Much more (visually) telling are images such as Fig. 2 , which shows a histogram of the skew estimates (for the full two hour trace) for all the sources in S 0 when mp ¼ 2; 000, md ¼ 50 minutes, and pv ¼ 1 ppm. (The true histogram may be shifted horizontally based on the clock skew of the Dag cards, but a horizontal shift does not affect the general shape of the distribution.) Empirically, for any given values for mp, md, and pv, we can compute the entropy of the distribution of clock skews. Doing so serves as a means of gauging how many bits of information an adversary might learn by passively monitoring a device's clock skew, assuming that devices' clock skews are constant over time, which is something we address later. To compute the entropy, we consider bins of width pv and, for each source s in S 0 , we increment the count of the bin corresponding to devices with clock skews similar to the skew of s (here, we use the skew estimate computed over full two hours). We then allocate another bin of size jSj À jS 0 j; this bin counts the number of sources that do not have consistent clock skew measurements. We apply the standard entropy formula [33] to compute the entropy of this distribution of bins, the results of which appear in the last column of Table 3 . As one might expect, the amount of information available to an adversary increases as mp and md increase.
Assuming that clock skews are constant over time, our results suggest that a passive adversary could learn at least six bits of information about a physical device by applying our techniques from Section 4. We anticipate that more bits of information will be available to an active adversary since an active adversary might be able to force the fingerprintee to send packets more frequently or over longer periods of time. Additionally, these entropy estimates will be higher for devices with high intended TSopt clock frequencies Hz½C tcp (see Table 4 and the discussion below). The latter observation suggests that high Hz½C tcp values for the purposes of RTT estimation and optimizing TCP performance may imply a slight trade-off in privacy. Similarly, since the TSopt clock frequencies on some systems are derived from the kernels' HZ variables, high HZ values for the purpose of increasing the performance of some applications [14] may also imply a slight trade-off in privacy.
We can use our two-hour OC-48 traces to evaluate the stability and accuracy of our TSopt clock skew measurements over the course of the two hours. Table 4 considers hosts that transmit more than mp ¼ 2; 000 packets in both the first and the second hours of BB N and which also transmit for at least md ¼ 50 minutes in both hours. The rows in Table 4 are broken down into (our estimates of the) intended frequencies for this subset of devices. For each device, we use our technique from Section 4 to estimate the clock skew of the device over the whole trace, just the first hour, and just the second hour, and then we compute the maximum difference among these three estimates. The last three columns in Table 4 show the maximum such difference for the lower nth percentile, e.g., for 90 percent of the hosts with Hz½C tcp ¼ 100 Hz, mp ¼ 2; 000 packets, and md ¼ 50 minutes, our skew estimation technique reported clock skews that differed by at most 0:76 ppm between the first hour, the second hour, and the whole trace. Table 4 suggests that our clock skew estimates are generally more accurate for devices with higher intended frequencies; this result is as one would expect since higher frequency clocks have finer granularity than low frequency clocks. (The low number of sources with Hz½C tcp ¼ 10 in Table 4 is consistent with our observation from Section 4 that Windows machines do not typically initiate flows with the TCP timestamps option enabled.)
Distribution of Clock Skews: Experiments with a Homogeneous Lab
One observation on the above analysis is that we applied it to a wide variety of machines running a wide variety of operating systems. Here, we investigate whether the distribution shown in Fig. 2 is due to operating system differences or to actual physical differences on the devices. We conducted an experiment with 69 (apparently) homogeneous machines in one of UCSD's undergraduate computing laboratories. All the machines were Micron PCs with 448MHz Pentium II processors running Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service Pack 1. Our measurer, host2, was a Dell Precision 410 with a 448MHz Pentium III processor and running Debian 3.0 with a recompiled 2.4.18 kernel; host2 is located within the university's computer science department and is 3 hops and a half a millisecond away from the machines in the undergraduate laboratory.
To create the requisite trace of TCP packets from these machines, we repeatedly opened and then closed connections from host2 to each of these machines. Each open-thenclose resulted in the Windows machines sending two packets to host2 with the TCP timestamps option turned on (the Windows machine sent three packets for each flow, but the TCP timestamp was always zero in the first of these three packets). Because of our agreement with the administrators of these machines, we were only able to open and close connections with these Windows machines at random intervals between zero and five minutes long. Thus, on average, we would expect to see each machine send host2 48 TCP packets with the TCP timestamps option turned on per hour. The experiment lasted for 38 days, beginning at 19:00PDT 2004-09-07 and ending at approximately 20:30PDT 2004-10-15. Fig. 3 shows a plot, similar to Fig. 1 , for the 69 Micron machines as measured by host2, but subsampled to one out of every two packets. Note that the plot uses different colors for the observed offsets for different machines (colors are overloaded). Since the slopes of the sets of points for a machine corresponds to the machine's skew, this figure clearly shows that some machines in the lab have measurably different clock skews. Thus, we can easily distinguish some devices by their clock skews (for other devices, we cannot). Because Windows XP machines reset their TSopt clocks to zero when they reboot, some of the diagonal lines seem to disappear several days into the figure. Our algorithms handle reboots by recalibrating the initial observed offset, though this recalibration is not visible in Fig. 3 . The time in Fig. 3 
begins on 8:30PDT
2004-09-10 (Friday) specifically because the administrators of the lab tend to reboot machines around 8:00PDT, and beginning the plot on Friday morning means that there are fewer reboots in the figure. We consider this experiment in more detail below, where our focus is on the stability of our clock skew estimates.
Stability of Clock Skews
We now consider the stability of the TSopt clock skews for the devices in the above-mentioned undergraduate laboratory. Recall that our experiment began at 19:00PDT 2004-09-07 and that the experiment ran for 38 days; see also Fig. 3 . Consider a single machine in the laboratory. We divide the trace for this machine into 12 and 24-hour periods, discarding 12-hour periods with less than 528 packets from the device, and discarding 24-hour periods with less than 1,104 packets from the device (doing so corresponds to discarding 12-hour periods when the device is not up for at least approximately 11 hours, and discarding 24-hour periods that the device is not up for at least 23 hours). We compute the device's clock skew for each nondiscarded period and then compute the difference between the maximum and minimum estimates for the nondiscarded periods. This value gives us an indication of the stability of the device's clock skew.
For 12-hour periods, the maximum difference for a single device in the lab ranged between 1.29 ppm and 7.33 ppm, with a mean of 2.28 ppm. The current results strongly support our claim that modern processors have relatively stable clock skews. Moreover, we believe that, if the administrators of the lab allowed us to exchange more packets with the 69 fingerprintees, we would have found the clock skews to be even more stable. In Section 7, we apply our clock skew estimates to a single computer at multiple locations and on multiple dates, and the skew estimates again are close (Table 5) ; our results below further support our claim of the stability of clock skews over time.
ACCESS TECHNOLOGY, TOPOLOGY, AND MEASURER-INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS
Here, we consider our experiments which suggest that clock skew estimates are relatively independent of the fingerprintee's access technology, the topology between the fingerprintee and the measurer, and the measurer's machine.
Laptops in Multiple Locations
Our first set of experiments along these lines measures laptop connected to the Internet via multiple access technologies and locations (Table 5) . For all these experiments, laptop is a Dell Latitude C810 notebook with a 1.133GHz Pentium III Mobile processor and running a default installation of Red Hat 9.0 (Linux kernel 2.4. .
The measurer in all these experiments, host1, is a Dell Precision 340 with a 2GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor located within the UCSD Computer Science and Engineering department and running Debian 3.0 with a recompiled 2.4.18 Linux kernel; host1 is also configured to synchronize its system time with true time via NTP. For all experiments, we establish a TCP connection between laptop and host1, and then exchange TCP packets over that connection. On host1, we record a trace of the connection using tcpdump. We then use our techniques from Section 4 to estimate the skew of laptop's TSopt clock. As the horizontal line in Table 5 indicates, we divide our experiments into two sets. In the first set, our experiments last for three hours and exchange one TCP packet every minute (we do this by performing a sleepð60Þ on host1). For the second set of experiments, the connections last for 30 minutes, and a packet is exchanged at random intervals between 0 and 2 seconds, as determined by a usleep on host1. With few exceptions, the packets from laptop are all ACKs with no data.
We conduct experiments when the laptop is connected to the Internet via residential cable networks on both coasts (Table 5 ). For our residential experiments, we use a 802.11b wireless connection with 128-bit WEP encryption, a standard (unencrypted) 802.11b wireless connection, and a standard 10Mbps 10baseT wired connection. We also conducted experiments with our laptop connected to the San Diego Supercomputer Center's 802.11b wireless network, from the UCSD Computer Science and Engineering wireless network, and from the San Diego Public Library's wireless network. As the final column in the table shows, the skew estimates are all within a fraction of a ppm of each other. (If we subsample the first set of experiments to one packet every 3 minutes, then the difference between the skew estimates for any two measurements in the first set is at most 0.45 ppm.)
PlanetLab and Topology Questions
Although the above results strongly suggest that skew estimates are independent of access technology, the above experiments do not stress-test the topology between the fingerprinter and the fingerprintee. Therefore, we conducted the following set of experiments. We selected a set of PlanetLab nodes from around the world that reported, via ntptrace, approximately accurate system times. We chose PlanetLab machines located at UC San Diego, UC Berkeley, University of Washington, University of Toronto (Canada), Princeton, MIT, University of Cambridge (UK), ETH (Switzerland), IIT (India), and Equinix (Singapore). These PlanetLab machines, along with host1 and (in one case) CAIDA's test machine with a CDMA-synchronized Dag card, served as our fingerprinters. Our fingerprintees were laptop and host1, where laptop was connected both to the SDSC wireless and to the CAIDA wired networks.
For each of our experiments, and for each of our chosen PlanetLab nodes, we created a flow between the node and the fingerprintee. Over each flow our fingerprintee sent one packet at random intervals between 0 and 2 seconds; here, the fingerprintee executed usleep with appropriate parameters. We then recorded the flows on the PlanetLab machines using plabdump, the tcpdump equivalent for PlanetLab machines. On host1, we recorded the corresponding flow using tcpdump. And, on the machine with the Dag card, we used Coral [19] (that machine was only reachable when laptop was connected directly to CAIDA's wired network). We then computed the skew using the techniques from Section 4. The results for laptop are shown in Table 6 . Notice that the skew estimates are in general within a fraction of a ppm of each other, suggesting that our skew estimates are independent of topology.
For distance measurements for Table 6 , we used traceroute to determine hop count, and then used mean time between when tcpdump recorded a packet on the measured device and the time between when plabdump recorded the packet on the measurer. This distance estimate also includes the time spent in the application layers on the machines, but should give a rough estimate of the time it takes packets to go from the fingerprintee to the measurer.
The results of these experiments suggest that our TSopt clock skew estimation technique is generally independent of the topology and distance between the fingerprinter and the fingerprintee. Furthermore, these results suggest that our skew estimation technique is independent of the actual fingerprinter, assuming that the fingerprinter synchronizes its system time with NTP [25] or something better [34] .
EFFECTS oF OPERATING SYSTEM, NTP, AND SPECIAL CASES

Operating Systems and NTP on Fingerprintee
In Table 7 , we show skew estimates for the same physical device, laptop, running both Red Hat 9.0 and Windows XP SP2, and both with and without NTP-based system clock synchronization. (For this experiment, laptop sent one packet to the measurer, host1, at random intervals between 0 and 2 seconds; laptop was connected to the SDSC wireless network and was seven hops away from host1; host1 also sent a ICMP Timestamp Request to laptop at random intervals between 0 and 60 seconds.) The table shows that, for the listed operating systems, the system clock and the TSopt clock effectively have the same clock skew when the device's system time is not synchronized with NTP and that the TSopt clock skew is independent of whether the device's system clock is maintained via NTP. Although not shown in the figure, our experiments with OpenBSD 3.5 on another machine suggest that the TSopt clock and system clock on default 
Power Options for Laptops
We also consider how the clock skews of devices are affected by the power options of laptops. In the case of Red Hat 9.0, when laptop is running with the power connected, if we switch to battery power, there is a brief jump in the TSopt clock offset-set for the device, and then the device continues to have the same (within a fraction of a ppm) clock skew. For laptop running Windows XP SP2, if the laptop is idle from user input but continues to maintain a TCP flow that we can monitor, then the TSopt clock skew changes after we switch to battery power. If we repeat this experiment several times and if we boot with only battery power, we find that the clock skews with battery power are in all cases similar. When booting with outlet power, the clock skew on laptop running Windows XP initially begins with a large magnitude, and then stabilizes to a skew like that in Table 7 until we disconnect the power; the initially large skew may be due to the laptop recharging its batteries. We have not sampled a large enough set of laptops to determine whether the clock skews with battery power are a simple function of the clock skews with outlet power, though the skews with battery power seem to be consistent for a single laptop.
Temperature
Although our experiments do not suggest a significant (beyond a fraction of a ppm) variation in laptop's skew when the surrounding temperature varies (from a temperature-controlled machine room to an unairconditioned room during the summer), we did not rigorously investigate the effects of temperature on our clock skew estimates. We acknowledge that such a study would help provide greater insights into the efficacy of our techniques. If a rigorous study finds that temperature variations do cause remotely detectable changes in modern devices' TSopt clock skews, then the information leakage about the environment surrounding a device might be useful to certain adversaries.
APPLICATIONS
We now consider some applications of our techniques, though we emphasize that we consider our most important results to be the foundations we introduced in the previous sections that make the following applications possible.
Virtualization and Virtual Honeynets
We created a honeyd [31] version 0.8b virtual honeynet consisting of 100 Linux 2.4.18 virtual hosts and 100 Windows XP SP1 virtual hosts. Our server in this experiment, host3, is identical to host1, has 1GB of RAM, and maintains its system time via NTP. We ran honeyd with standard nmap and xprobe2 configuration files as input; honeyd used the information in these files to mimic real Linux and Windows machines. We ran nmap and xprobe2 against the virtual hosts to verify that nmap and xprobe2 could not distinguish the virtual hosts from real machines. We applied our TCP timestamps and ICMP-based skew estimation techniques to all 200 virtual hosts. Our fingerprinter in this experiment was on the same local network. We observed several methods for easily distinguishing between honeyd virtual hosts and real machines. First, we noticed that unlike real Linux and Windows machines, the virtual hosts always returned ICMP Timestamp Replies with zero in the transmit timestamp field. Additionally, we observed that the honeyd Windows XP virtual hosts had TSopt clocks C tcp with Hz½C tcp ¼ 2, whereas all of the real Windows XP machines that we tested had Hz½C tcp ¼ 10. The lesson here is that although the nmap and xprobe2 configuration files provide enough information for the respective programs to effectively fingerprint real operating systems, the configuration files do not provide enough information for honeyd to be able to correctly mimic all aspects of the Linux and Windows protocol stacks.
Even if honeyd completely mimicked the network stacks of real Linux 2.4.18 and Windows XP SP1 machines, we could still use our remote physical device fingerprinting techniques to distinguish between our 200 virtual hosts and 200 real machines. Our TSopt clock skew estimates for all 200 virtual hosts were approximately zero and the system clock skew estimates for all 200 virtual hosts were approximately the same positive value. Given our discussion in Section 6 of the distribution of clock skews, this lack of variability in clock skews between virtual hosts is not what one would expect from real machines. Furthermore, the TSopt and system clocks between all the virtual hosts of the same operating system were highly correlated, e.g., Fig. 4 shows the TSopt offset-sets for all 100 Windows XP SP1 virtual hosts 241 minutes into our experiment. In Fig. 4 , we connect the points in the offset-sets for each virtual host to highlight the correlation between the hosts. Recall that we observed no such correlation in our experiment with 69 real Windows XP machines (Fig. 3) . We communicated our results to the author of honeyd and, in response, version 1.0 of honeyd randomly assigns TSopt clock skews to each virtual host using a Gaussian distribution around the server's system time. This decision may affect other components of the system, e.g., if the server runs ntpd, changes to the server's system time may appear as global changes to the distribution of the virtual hosts' clocks. Version 1.0 of honeyd still issues ICMP Timestamp Replies with zero transmit timestamps. Furthermore, the system clocks on version 1.0 honeyd virtual hosts are still highly synchronized and are too fast by several orders of magnitude.
To experiment with real virtualization technologies, we installed VMware Workstation 4.5.2 on host3, but this time host3 ran Red Hat 9.0. We then installed five default copies of Red Hat 9.0 under VMware. We applied our skew estimation techniques to these five virtual machines, as well as to host3. The results show that the five virtual machines do not have constant (or near constant) clock skews, shown by the nonlinearity of the points in Fig. 5 . Furthermore, the overall magnitude of the clock skews on these virtual machines (greater than 400 ppm) is larger than we would expect for physical desktop machines. We feel confident that these observations and natural extensions could prove useful in distinguishing virtual honeynets from real networks.
Counting the Number of Devices behind a NAT
Another natural application of our techniques is to count the number of devices behind a NAT. To briefly recall previous work in this area, Bellovin [7] showed that an adversary can exploit the IP ID field to count the number of devices behind a NAT, but his approach is limited in three ways: 1) the IP ID field is only 16-bits long, 2) recent operating systems now use constant or random IP ID fields, and 3) his technique cannot count the total number of devices behind a NAT if not all of them are active at the same time. Our suggested approach to this problem has two phases. First, partition the trace into (candidate) sets corresponding to different sequences of time-dependent TCP timestamps; creating such a partition is relatively easy to do unless two machines have approximately the same TSopt clock values at some point in time, perhaps because the machines booted at approximately the same time.
Then, apply our clock skew estimation techniques to each partition, counting hosts as unique if they have measurably different clock skews. If two devices have approximately the same TSopt clock values at some point in time but have measurably different clock skews, then one can detect and correct this situation in the analysis of the partition's offset-set.
Forensics and Tracking Individual Devices
The utility of our techniques for forensics purposes follows closely from our claims 1) that there is variability in the clock skews between different physical devices (Section 6), 2) that the clock skew for a single device is approximately constant over time (Section 6), and 3) that our clock skew estimates are independent of access technology, topology, and the measurer (Section 7). For forensics, we anticipate that our techniques will be most useful when arguing that a given device was not involved in a recorded event. With respect to tracking individual devices, we stress that our techniques do not provide unique serial numbers for devices, but that our skew estimates do provide valuable bits of information that, when combined with other sources of information such as operating system fingerprinting results, can help track individual devices on the Internet.
DHCP
The use of DHCP can cause significant problems for many forms of network mapping since the measurer may not be able to uniquely identify a node by its IP address and therefore has to deal with a mix of measurements coming from different hosts, e.g., [8] . The use of DHCP thus renders conclusions about any kind of network statistics tenuous because one is unable to say whether the measured phenomena represents a certain fraction of hosts; the measurement is influenced by the dynamics of hosts joining and leaving the network. Any technique that can help disambiguate hosts behind a DHCP server, therefore, has both network mapping and security applications. One might be able to use our techniques to help remotely track (with some probability) the assignment of IP addresses within an address block to physical machines via DHCP.
Unanonymizing Anonymized Data Sets
It is common for organizations that provide network traces containing payload data to anonymize the IP addresses in the traces using some prefix-preserving anonymization method [36] , [37] . If an organization makes available both anonymized and unanonymized traces from the same link, one can use our techniques to catalyze the unanonymization of the anonymized traces. traces that have the TCP timestamps option enabled. Since the anonymization is prefix-preserving, given the candidate mappings one can begin to unanonymize address blocks. We are unaware of any previous discussion of the problems to prefix-preserving anonymization caused by leaking information about a source via the TCP timestamps option.
Intentional Clock Skew Abnormalities
Most users would likely not notice if their devices had large or nonconstant TSopt clock skews. A hardware vendor wishing to track physical devices with few false positives could therefore design their devices to have large or otherwise abnormal clock skews. A user could also use his or her device's TSopt clock as a covert channel by intentionally varying the device's TSopt clock skew in a controlled manner. This observation confirms McDanel's conjecture [21] that it may be possible to embed covert information in the TCP timestamps option field of a device's outgoing packets. We consider the applications in this section to be mostly of academic interest.
POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES
The primary focus of this paper is on developing techniques to fingerprint current generation physical devices when running current generation operating systems. Although (by definition) the techniques we describe above will remain applicable to current generation systems, we suspect that future generation security systems might incorporate countermeasures to some of the fingerprinting techniques that we uncover. We explore some possible protection mechanisms in this section.
The surest way for a device to protect itself against our ICMP-based fingerprinting technique (Section 5) would be for the device to not reply to ICMP Timestamp Requests. Another solution might be for the device to synchronize its system time via NTP. Although synchronizing a device's system time with NTP would address our current ICMP-based fingerprinting technique, we caution that this solution might still be susceptible to more sophisticated fingerprinting techniques that exploit detectable clock skews between NTP adjustments (or the NTP server could be the adversary wishing to fingerprint different devices).
Similar to an observation above, the surest way for a device to protect itself against our TCP timestamps-based fingerprinting technique (Section 4) would be for the device to not enable the TCP timestamps option in outgoing packets. If there are circumstances that make this solution undesirable (e.g., because the use of TCP timestamps improves RTT estimation and TCP performance), another approach for protecting against our TCP timestamps-based fingerprinting technique would be to reduce a device's clock skew. An operating system might reduce its clock skew by, at boot, making a more precise estimation of the oscillator frequencies supplying the hardware basis for its clocks. An operating system might also incorporate the techniques for precise software clocks from Pásztor and Veitch [28] and Veitch et al. [34] . An operating system might also pick a random multiplication factor at boot and multiply its TCP timestamps by that factor in order to mask its clock skew.
Although the above suggestions may protect against our current TCP timestamps-based fingerprinting technique, the above techniques may still leak some information about a device in the TCP timestamps option field of each outgoing packet. To address this concern from RFC 1323 [18] , we conclude that two parties in a TCP flow do not actually need to know each other's TCP timestamps. Consequently, a device could encrypt its timestamps using a secret key, assuming an appropriate encryption mechanism for 32-bit blocks. The device could also maintain a table mapping the (possibly random) 32-bit values that it includes in the TCP timestamps fields of outgoing packets to its internal representation of real timestamps; the table should only need to be as large as the device's TCP retransmission window. We have not evaluated the performance of these recommendations. We do remark that the recommendations in this paragraph break strict compliance with RFC 1323 since the RFC says: "The timestamp value to be sent in TSval is to be obtained from a (virtual) clock that we call the 'timestamp clock'. Its values must be at least approximately proportional to real time, in order to measure actual RTT [18] ."
OTHER MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES
In Section 10, we argue that although the techniques we explore in this paper will likely remain applicable to current generation systems, future generation security systems might try to resist some of our techniques, e.g., future generation systems might incorporate some of the protection mechanisms from Section 10. In anticipation of these future systems, we consider possible avenues for clockbased physical device fingerprinting when information about a system's TSopt clock or system clock is not readily available to an adversary; we do not consider here but recognize the possibility of fingerprinting techniques that profile other aspects of a device's hardware, e.g., processor speed or memory. These directions assume that new operating systems mask or do not include the TSopt clock values in the TCP headers and do not reply to ICMP Timestamp Requests, but that the systems' underlying clocks still have nonnegligible skews. The techniques we propose in this section are less refined than the techniques elsewhere in this paper; we envision the techniques here as starting points for more sophisticated techniques.
Fourier Transform
Some systems send packet at 10 or 100 ms intervals, perhaps due to interrupt processing or other internal operating system feature on one side of a flow. When this condition holds, we can use the Fourier transform to extract information about the system's clock skew. Fig. 6 plots the TSopt clock offset-sets for a device in BB S with a 2 Hz TSopt clock. The five diagonal bands suggests that the machine clusters packet transmissions at approximately 100 ms intervals, and we can use the Fourier transform on packet arrival times to estimate the frequency at which the device actually transmits packets (here, packet arrival times refers to the times at which the monitor records the packets). For the source shown in Fig. 6 , after computing the Fourier transform, the frequency with the highest amplitude was 25.00439, which implies a skew of 25:00439=25 À 1, or 175.6 ppm. Moreover the top 19 frequencies output by the Fourier transform all imply skews between 171.0 ppm and 179.3 ppm. These values are all close to the 175.2 ppm output by our TCP timestamps-based approach, but do not make any use of the TCP timestamps contained with the packets.
Although our Fourier-based technique does not require knowledge of a device's TSopt or system clocks, our Fourier-based solution is currently not automated. This lack of automation, coupled with the fact that current generation systems readily relinquish information about their TSopt and system clocks, means that our Fourierbased solution is currently less attractive than the techniques we described in Sections 4 and 5. If, in the future, operating system designers decide to address the information leakage concerns we raise with respect to the TCP timestamps option and ICMP Timestamp Requests, then the technique we mention here may become more relevant.
Periodic User-Level Activities
Toward estimating the system clock skew of devices that do not synchronize their system times with NTP, we note that many applications perform certain operations at semiregular intervals. For example, one can configure most mail clients to poll for new mail every n minutes. As another example, Broido et al. show that some Microsoft Windows 2000 and XP systems access DNS servers at regular intervals [11] . It may be possible to infer information about a device's system clock skew by comparing differences between actual intervals of time between these periodic activities and what the application intends for those intervals of time to be.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we verified the ability and developed techniques for remote physical device fingerprinting that exploit the fact that modern computer chips have small yet nontrivial and remotely detectable clock skews. We showed how our techniques apply to a number of different goals, ranging from remotely distinguishing between virtual honeynets and real networks to counting the number of hosts behind a NAT. Although the techniques we described will likely remain applicable to current generation systems, we suspect that future generation security systems might offer countermeasures to resist some of the fingerprinting techniques that we uncover. In anticipation of such developments, we discussed possible avenues for physical device fingerprinting when information about a system's TSopt clock or system clock are not readily available to the adversary. Our results compellingly illustrate a fundamental reason why securing real-world systems is so genuinely difficult: It is possible to extract security-relevant signals from data canonically considered to be noise. This aspect renders perfect security elusive and, even more ominously, suggests that there remain fundamental properties of networks that we have yet to integrate into our security models. Tadayoshi Kohno is a computer security and cryptography doctoral student at the University of California at San Diego. He is the recipient of a National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship and an IBM PhD Fellowship.
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